Security infrastructure for healthcare.

Clinical-safety aware security foundations. Zero-trust, evidenced controls, and operations that understand that a locked-out clinician is a patient-safety event.

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Overview

Security infrastructure infrastructure for healthcare, built to the standard institutions in this sector are required to operate.

XVICA designs, builds, and operates this layer for healthcare clients in the UK, US, Canada, and Australia. The work is specified against the regulatory regime, the operational profile, and the examination expectations of this sector before any code is written.

01Why it matters

What healthcare cannot get wrong here.

Ransomware against healthcare providers is a clinical continuity event, not just a data event.
A security control that blocks a clinician in an emergency is itself a patient-safety risk.
Medical devices present security characteristics no IT estate is designed for.
Information governance and security committees can both veto a rollout independently.

02Regulatory posture

Named regimes, mapped controls

Regulatory requirements are translated into explicit control requirements, then mapped to tests and evidence collection. Nothing is implied.

UK healthcare

NHS Data Security and Protection Toolkit, Cyber Assessment Framework for NHS, NHS Digital security standards, and Caldicott Principles.

US healthcare

HIPAA Security Rule, HITECH, HITRUST CSF where used, state breach-notification law, and CMS information-security requirements.

Medical devices

IEC 62304 for device software and increasing convergence with IEC 62443 for device networks; manufacturer SBOM expectations rising.

03Reference architecture

Design decisions distinctive to this intersection

Components and design choices that recur across our work for this sector. Each deployment is specified individually.

Zero-trust with clinical context

Access decisions consider clinical role and care relationship as first-class policy inputs, not just directory group.

Clinical-continuity-aware response

Incident runbooks classify clinical impact alongside technical impact. Degraded-mode operation is planned, not improvised.

Medical-device segmentation

Devices live in their own zone with monitored egress and a documented path for updates.

Backup tested under ransomware assumptions

Restore exercised against immutable backups with documented recovery time objectives for clinical systems.

Joint evidence for IG and security committees

Control evidence in a form both committees review without retranslation.

04XVICA's approach

How we work in healthcare.

Healthcare security has a constraint that commercial security rarely faces: the harm caused by an over-zealous control can exceed the harm it was meant to prevent. A locked-out clinician, a delayed medication, a blocked imaging transfer — these are patient-safety events. We build with that reality shaping policy rather than bolted on as an exception. Zero-trust is specified with clinical context; break-glass is a planned safety feature with auditable review; backup strategy is tested against the ransomware scenarios healthcare actually faces rather than generic enterprise models. Information-governance and security committees get evidence in a shared form, so a rollout clears both in parallel rather than sequentially. The outcome is a security posture that measurably improves during incidents — including the ones that would have become clinical-continuity events under weaker design.

05Engagement